The
Restored Burlington Northern Depot & WWII Memorial Museum
Excerpt from Tunisia 17 November 1942 – 13 May
1943,
by Charles R.
Anderson, U.S. Army Center of Military History:
Strategic
Setting
“…By
the end of November [ 1942 ] the Allies would have
253,213 troops in North Africa. The Axis buildup began at an equally
frenzied pace. As early as 10 November the Italian Air Force sent to
Tunis a flight of 28 fighters. Two days later an airlift began that would
bring to Tunisia over 15,000 men and 581 tons of supplies. During
November transports brought to the ports of Tunis and Bizerte 176 tanks, 131
artillery pieces, 1,152 vehicles, and 13,000 tons of supplies. To strengthen
Axis units already in North Africa, the Germans sent three fresh divisions, the
Italians two. Due to limited Allied naval capability, Axis submarines
could attack Allied ships in waters between Sicily and Tunisia with little
worry about Allied antisubmarine retaliation…on 13 November…the Allies gained
their major objective: French forces in North Africa would immediately assist
American and British forces in liberating Tunisia and, later, metropolitan
France…
Operations
On 30 January [ 1943 ]
the 21st Panzer Division blasted through French defenders at Faid Pass, then
drove off an American relief column the next day. The attack on Faid interrupted
preparations for an assault by the U.S. II Corps on Maknassy,
thirty-two miles south. The attack went ahead on the 31st but was fatally
compromised when Allied commanders argued whether American armor should be
concentrated for the Maknassy operation or diverted
to a counterattack on Faid. By 3 February von Arnim and Rommel had the results they wanted: the Allied
counterattack on Faid had failed, the II Corps attack
on Maknassy had been stopped and recalled and Allied
units were withdrawing. As a bonus,
dissension appeared in the Alliance when the French protested ineffective
American support.
While
Eisenhower struggled to contain squabbles on the Allied side, the Germans
refueled their tanks and continued west. On the 14th they hit Sidi Bou
Zid, ten miles beyond Faid. With over 200 tanks on
both sides, a huge, drawn-out battle appeared in the making. But American
armor was spread too thin, and the panzers punched through in only one
day. An ineffective counterattack the next day and the stunning capture
of some 1,400 troops forced the Americans to undertake a major
withdrawal. As the 1st Armored Division fell back, enemy pressure eased.
However, on the 16th the panzers resumed their westward push, seizing Sbeitla, twenty-five miles beyond Sidi
Bou Zid.
Again
the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time
at Kasserine Pass. Four days of successive defeats
cost II Corps dearly. The Americans lost 2,546 missing, 103 tanks, 280
vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, and 1 antiaircraft battery.
Even service and medical companies, miles behind the infantry and armor, had
been reached by the onrushing panzers.
The
succession of II Corps defeats did not end with the loss of Sbeitla.
Rommel saw the opportunity to keep his battered adversary reeling with a push
for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to
Algeria. Adding the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his German-Italian
Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps on 19 February. By the next
afternoon the pass was in Axis hands. Only the valiant stands of
individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's
progress.
As
an alarming indication of falling morale, American troops abandoned huge stocks
of equipment. In a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was
ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis
priorities. Concerned that the British Eighth Army might attack from
Libya while he was moving west, Rommel turned back to the east.
The
conduct of Allied operations in both northern Tunisia in December 1942 and the
central mountain ranges in February 1943 forced a total reexamination of Allied
organization and plans. In short order General Eisenhower restructured
the Allied command and changed key personnel. A new command, the 18th
Army Group under British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, tightened
operational control over the combat corps and armies of the three Allied
nations. With the British Eighth Army now close enough to the Allied southern
flank to affect Axis operations, the three national commands in Tunisia
narrowed their battlefronts and shifted north. Because the U.S. II Corps
had taken high casualties and lost so much equipment during the February
battles, and, in the British view, shown tactical incompetence, the Americans
were to play a role auxiliary to the British in the next phase of the campaign.
Accordingly, Alexander's staff was primarily British.
During
late February and early March Allied units in Tunisia increased their combat
power. Two fresh British divisions arrived and the British 6th Armoured Division refitted with American Sherman
tanks. The French XIX Corps turned in its prewar equipment for the latest
American weapons. The U.S. II Corps received the rest of the 1st, 9th,
and 34th Infantry Division components from Algeria and replaced lost tanks and
equipment as fast as ships, trains, and trucks could bring them to the front.
Engineer and other support specialists improved and expanded ports, rail lines,
and roads. Best of all for the troops on the ground, Allied
air support soon improved. The Mediterranean Air Command under British
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder went into
operation in late February. Consisting of the U.S. Ninth and Twelfth Air
Forces and four major Royal Air Force commands, Mediterranean Air Command could
put over the battlefield enough aircraft to challenge seriously the air
superiority enjoyed by the Axis thus far in the campaign.
The
Americans received the highest-level personnel change when in early March
Eisenhower selected Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to command II Corps.
Now the Allies had a field commander who would cause his adversaries genuine
concern for his willingness to attempt maneuvers others thought rash.
With Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy, Patton set about rebuilding the
II Corps into the panzer-killing force he knew it could become.
Overlooking no detail, including neckties in the heat of North Africa, Patton
pushed his men to fight and dress like the best
soldiers in the world.
Within
days they knew they were led by a commander who would not let them fail…
Analysis
If
American commanders and troops thought their brief combat experience in French Morocco
and Algeria in November 1942 was adequate preparation to face hardened Axis
units in a lengthy campaign, the fighting in Tunisia brought about a harsh
reappraisal. With few exceptions, French units in North Africa had been
more intent on upholding national honor than inflicting casualties and damage;
those that offered determined resistance were at a marked disadvantage in terms
of weapons, equipment, supplies, and numbers.
In
Tunisia, however, American soldiers found themselves faced with well-trained,
battle-tested units skillfully using the most advanced weapons and innovative
combined arms tactics repeatedly to frustrate Allied plans. The result
was painful to Army units involved and a shock to the American public: five
months of almost continuous setbacks with commensurably high casualties.
The
fighting in Tunisia underlined both the strengths and weaknesses of the Western
Alliance and the United States Army. On the political level the
successful conclusion of the Tunisia Campaign left one Allied problem unsolved:
factionalism among the French. Followers of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud
were still unable to unite in a common cause. In the victory parade in
Tunis on 20 May Gaullist troops refused to march with those loyal to Giraud.
Until some basis for political cooperation was found, the French would likely
remain unable to make more of a military contribution to Allied operations than
their two-division XIX Corps. But that was perhaps not so bleak a
prospect when considered against enemy losses in Tunisia: nearly 200,000 battle
casualties (an entire field army), 275,000 prisoners of war, tons of equipment
and supplies, and the mortal wounding of Italy as an Axis partner.
On
the tactical level the Allies were slow to amass the naval and air forces
necessary to stop the flow of Axis supplies from Sicily. Not until the
last month of the campaign did the Allies push enemy supply levels below the
minimum tonnages Kesselring needed to continue offensive operations. Of
more immediate concern to Allied ground commanders, theater-level air forces
were unable to neutralize enemy airfields on Sicily despite frequent
attacks. In addition, enemy airfields in Tunisia, even those outside the
Tunis bridgehead, remained operational well into April.
The
last weeks of the campaign also saw troubling, and somewhat unexpected,
problems arise between American and British ground commanders. After
nearly six months of working together in the field, British headquarters
officers and their II Corps counterparts found a new area of dispute in their
respective missions. American commanders were unhappy with the abrupt
mission changes ordered by British commanders, and the latter became at least
temporarily disillusioned with American tactical capabilities. In order
for the American-British partnership to remain functional, headquarters staffs
of the two allies would have to do a better job of assigning missions and
managing accomplishment, and American units would have to give better accounts
of themselves tactically, a problem which they recognized openly and had begun
to solve in the latter stages of the campaign.
At
the beginning of the Tunisian battle the United States Army had in the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations parts of four divisions which had acquired
only limited experience at a cost of very light casualties in only four days of
combat. The remainder of the force was completely
"green." At the end of the battle the Army had five full
divisions in the field, four of which had gained extensive experience although
the cost had been high. American divisions carried out major and minor
missions during the campaign in a generally successful manner, but notable
failures occurred at Kasserine Pass and Fondouk el Aouareb.
After
these battles, they were given supporting roles to gain experience.
Although American commanders chafed under this British-inspired practice, it
allowed the divisions to recover from each setback, and all showed later
improvement. Particularly satisfying to Eisenhower and
Bradley, the 34th Infantry Division began showing commendable tactical maturity
in the final weeks of the campaign. Despite casualty levels that would
enervate a green unit, the 34th skillfully coordinated air and artillery
support to enhance the effectiveness of its infantry-armor team advancing along
the II Corps southern flank [ italics added ].
All
ground combat arms showed varying degrees of improvement during the
campaign. American infantrymen deserve much praise for the persistence
they showed against a skilled enemy, most notably on 23-24 April when the 2d
Battalion, 18th Infantry, had to take the same objective three times before the
enemy quit the fight. One week later the 1st Division continued the
successful attack on Hill 523 despite crippling casualties in the 1st
Battalion, 16th Infantry. The weakest aspect of infantry operations was
coordination with other arms. Too often, gaps opened between troops and
tanks, forcing armor to pull back and slowing the tempo of the attack.
Some battalions had waited too long to advance after their artillery support
was lifted, allowing enemy troops to resume fighting positions, largely
nullifying the artillery fire. In other instances, artillery stopped too soon
after the seizure of objectives, inviting successful enemy counterattacks.
In
Tunisia American commanders showed a preference to begin attacks in the last
hour of darkness, a tactic which gave the infantry an advantage but created
problems for the artillery. Night movement is more difficult for artillerymen
because of their heavier equipment and the time needed to prepare and survey
gun positions. To lessen chances of detection, artillerymen also tended
to accelerate gun repositioning by sacrificing adequate defensive
measures. As a result, enemy counterattacks occasionally captured
howitzers before machine guns could be placed to cover approach routes.
In
their many battles against panzer units, American tankers learned much.
Tank doctrine before the Tunisia Campaign called for rapid thrusts deep into
enemy territory far in advance of infantry. But the devastating effect of
accurate enemy artillery, antitank guns, and Stuka
dive bombers forced a reconsideration. Greater
success with armor came when panzer tactics were adopted: a deliberate
tank-infantry advance preceded by intensive
reconnaissance and heavy artillery. In the latter stages of the campaign
a formula was laid down: one tank battalion in the attack should have three
artillery battalions in support.
The
greater lesson for armored units in Tunisia was to maintain concentration of
tanks. Too often, armored units were dispersed to fill gaps or served as
emergency reaction forces. These stopgap missions used the mobility of
armor but ignored the greater advantages of its shock effect and massed
firepower. When the 2d Armored Division operated as a unit in the battles
for Mateur and Bizerte, the spearhead potential of
armor was at last realized, and the enemy had to deal with sudden breaches in
defensive lines, disruption of command links, and chaos in supply dumps. Best of all, American casualties fell dramatically.
The
mission of tank destroyers (self-propelled antitank vehicles) was clarified
somewhat in Tunisia. Battle experience confirmed the fear of tank destroyer
crews: their thin armor made them easy targets for enemy tank and antitank
gunners in open terrain. They were most effective in an ambush role,
digging into a "hull down" position and awaiting a panzer
assault. Success in this role, however, depended on accurate intelligence
about enemy routes of approach. Over the course of the campaign tank
destroyers expended more ammunition in the traditional artillery support
mission than in any other role.
Air
support of ground operations remained a problem throughout the campaign. Not
only were there not enough squadrons in the theater to support all combat units
but the system of requesting air support was cumbersome as well, with ground
commanders having to go through several echelons of control. Tactical
commanders pressed for the assignment of specific squadrons to specific
regiments or divisions, but air commanders successfully argued against this
policy as wasteful of air resources. The results on the ground were too
often confusion and higher casualties. Air support had to be scheduled
hours or days in advance and on a few occasions was postponed or canceled
altogether, as the 34th Division found at Fondouk el Aouareb on 8 April. When air strikes did occur they
were of limited duration, so that if the infantry and armor achieved a
breakthrough, aircraft were often no longer overhead when the opportunity for
exploitation developed. Only in the last stage of the campaign did air
support take forms satisfactory to ground commanders: interdiction attacks on
enemy assembly areas and routes of approach. Solution of the air support
problem would have to await increased aircraft availability.
With
victory in Tunisia, the Allies had expelled Axis forces from North Africa and
thereby taken a giant step toward victory in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations. The United States Army had contributed mightily toward that
accomplishment. The victory in northwest Africa, however, did not come
cheaply. Of 70,000 Allied casualties, the United States Army lost 2,715
dead, 8,978 wounded' and 6,528 missing. At the same time, however, the
Army gained thousands of seasoned officers, noncommissioned officers, and
troops whose experience would prove decisive in subsequent campaigns.
These seasoned soldiers of all ranks would not have long to wait or far to go,
for the next test was only two months and 150 miles away: the island of Sicily.
“
Read Anderson’s entire essay on the Allied-Axis WWII
clash in Tunisia at
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/tunisia/tunisia.htm
The
Restored Burlington Northern Depot & WWII Memorial Museum
#####